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Assuming  that  asset  markets  are  complete  and  arbitrage-free,  the  exchange  rate can be 
expressed  in  terms  of  observables  in  a  multicountry,  multigood  general  equilibrium 
economy. In contrast to existing models of the exchange rate, this general model allows for 
international differences in consumption preferences, time preferences, and the degree of 
risk  aversion,  and  does  not  need  to  specify  the  imperfections  in  commodity  markets. 
Changes  in  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate  are  given  by  international  differences  in: 
(i) inflation  rates  computed  from  marginal  spending  weights,  (ii) growth  rates  of  real 
spending, weighted by the countries' measures of relative risk-aversion, and (iii) subjective 
discount rates. The discount rates and risk aversions can vary both over time and across 
countries. In this general framework, relative Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) holds only if 
preferences  are  homothetic  and,  either  (a) investors  are  risk  neutral  or  (b) commodity 
markets are perfect and preferences are identical across countries; in all other cases, CPI 
inflation is only one of the factors determining exchange rate changes. Thus, compared to 
this general model for exchange rates, standard regression and cointegration tests of PPP 
suffer  from  missing-variables  biases,  errors-in-variables  biases,  and ignore variations in 
risk aversions across countries and over time. An attractive feature of this model is that it 
nests several existing equilibrium models of the exchange rate and also PPP, thus providing 
a theoretical framework to distinguish empirically between these models. When estimating 
this equation as a long-run relationship, Sercu and Uppal (2000) and Apte, Sercu and Uppal 
(2006) find significant evidence against long-run PPP and largely supportive evidence in 
favor of the more general model. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
My objective, in this paper, is to review a model of the exchange rate in an 
arbitrage-free  economy  characterized  by  multiple  countries  and  multiple 
goods, without imposing strong restrictions on output processes, preferences, 
or the role of money. The model general also allows for various imperfections 
in commodity markets—non-traded goods, fixed and variable costs for trading 
goods internationally, and imperfect competition. The only restriction is that 
asset markets be complete and perfect. The paper builds on Lewis (1995) and 
Backus et al. (2003). A special case was already published by Sercu, Uppal 
and Van Hulle (1995). The first-order decomposition of changes in the pricing 
kernels (and, by extension, in the exchange-rate changes) was first published 
by Sercu and Uppal (2000), henceforth referred to as SU (2000). Johansen-
Juselius  cointegration  tests  using  levels  of  exchange  rates,  CPIs,  and 
consumption flows appear in the same source. Estimates of the model using a 
somewhat  different  technology  are  forthcoming  in  Apte,  Sercu  and  Uppal 
(2006), henceforth referred to as ASU (2006). 
  One  contribution  of  SU  (2000)  is  to  show  that  in  this  general 
economy changes in the exchange rate reflect  
 
(i)  international  differences  in  inflation  rates  computed  from 
marginal spending weights,  
(ii)  differences  in  growth  rates  of  real  spending  weighted  by  the 
countries' measures of relative risk-aversion,  
(iii)  differences in subjective discount rates, and  
(iv)  changes  in  any  other  state  variable  that  affects  the  marginal 
utility of nominal spending. The discount rates, risk aversions, 
and sensitivities to state variables can vary over time and across 
countries. This model reduces to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
under  restrictive  conditions.  Specifically,  for  PPP  to  hold, 
consumption  preferences  need  to  be  state-independent  and 
homothetic;  and,  in  addition,  either  investors  need  to  be  risk 
neutral,  or  consumption  preferences  must  be  identical  across 
countries and commodity markets must be perfect.  
 
  In order to examine this model empirically, one needs to express the 
exchange rate in terms of observable variables. Assuming that preferences are 
state-independent as well as homothetic, and that both relative risk aversion 
and time preferences are constant (but not necessarily equal across countries), 
an expression can be derived for the level of the exchange rate that contains 
PPP as a special case and is easily testable. When estimating this equation as a 
long-run  relation,  ASU  find  significant  evidence  against long-run PPP and 
largely supportive evidence in favor of the more general model. The model 
does not rule out long-run PPP, but improves upon it. 
  The theoretical findings are useful for two reasons. Deriving PPP as a 
special case of a more general model allows one to address a richer set of 
empirical  questions  than  is  possible  in  the  conventional  PPP  tests.  For  
instance,  the  general  model  has  implications  for  existing  tests  of  PPP:  it 
implies  that  standard  regression  tests of PPP suffer from missing-variables 
biases, errors-in-variables biases, and ignore variations in risk aversions across 
countries  and  over  time.  In  this  sense,  this  theoretical  work  complements 
recent work on exchange rates that has mostly concentrated on improving the 
econometric  methodology  and  extending  the  data used for testing the PPP 
hypothesis.
1  
  The  second  contribution  of  the  SU/ASU  papers  to  exchange-rate 
theory is that its results are quite general and encompass many earlier models 
of the exchange rate.
2 Existing equilibrium models of the exchange rate often 
depend on very specific assumptions about the number of goods and countries, 
utility  functions,  production  technologies,  and  the  type  of  friction  in  the 
international  goods  markets.  The  model  presented  here  for  exchange-rate 
changes, in contrast, is one where utility functions are quite general and can 
differ across countries, and where commodity markets may be imperfect. For 
example, our model encompasses the standard monetary model of exchange 
rates and the equilibrium exchange rate models of Stockman (1980), Lucas 
(1982), Stulz (1987), Dumas (1992), Backus and Smith (1993), Basak and 
Gallmeyer (1995), Sercu, Uppal and Van Hulle (1995), and Bakshi and Chen 
(1997). The economy allows for multiple countries and goods, while existing 
models are typically of a two-country, single-good economy or of an economy 
with  one  traded  good  and  one  non-traded  good  per  country.  Also,  risk 
aversions needs not be constant over time or across countries. The model also 
permits various imperfections in commodity markets, whereas existing models 
of the exchange rate typically allow for just proportional transportation costs, 
or zero costs for one good and infinite costs for the second (non-tradable) 
good.
3 For example, in this model international shipment of goods may be 
costly for some or even all of these goods; and the costs, if any, may involve 
one-time  entry  costs  that  limit  competition  in  the  goods  markets  or  fixed 
recurrent  outlays  (as  in  Baldwin  and  Krugman  (1989),  Dixit  (1989)  and 
Krugman  (1989))  and/or  purely  variable  expenses  (as  in  Dumas  (1992)), 
possibly with economies of scale.
4 
  There are two reasons why the SU/ASU results that are so general. 
First, if financial markets are complete, one can use the martingale-pricing 
approach to determine the exchange rate. Thus, there is no need to determine 
explicitly the equilibrium in the international economy.
5 Second, the model 
just expresses the exchange rate in terms of observables rather than exogenous 
factors, which is a much harder task.  
  The  third  contribution  of  SU/ASU  papers  is  the  empirical  work. 
Working  with  the  version  of  the  model  where  the  exchange  rate  can  be 
expressed in terms of observables, and which nests PPP as a special case, we 
compare the more general model to PPP. SU/ASU find that the additional 
variables suggested by the model are significant; that is, the general model 
outperforms PPP. Thus, we reject long-run PPP as the best available model 
for the real exchange rate in favor of our more general formulation. To take 
into account small-sample problems in the estimation, the significance tests 
are  based  on  extensive  Monte-Carlo  simulations  instead  of  asymptotic  
distributions. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I describe 
the  economy,  and  derive  the  change  in  the  exchange  rate  in  terms  of  the 
arguments of the pricing kernels.  In Section III, I express the exchange rate in 
terms  of  observable  variables  under  assumptions  that  are  increasingly 
restrictive.  This brings us, in Section IV, to the conditions under which PPP 
holds, and the implications of our theoretical work for empirical tests of PPP.  
Empirical results are reviewed in Section V.  Section VI concludes. To make 
it easier to identify the main results, these are presented as propositions with 
intermediate results in lemmas. 
 
 
II. THE ECONOMY AND THE EXCHANGE RATE 
 
In this section, I describe a model of a multicountry, multigood economy with 
imperfect  commodity  markets,  and  derive  a  general  expression  for  the 
exchange  rate  change  in  terms  of  the  arguments  of  the  pricing  kernels.  I 
impose only a few (very standard) restrictions on preferences, and none on the 
production or endowment processes or on the degree or type of commodity 
market imperfections. Nor do I need to specify explicitly the role money plays 
in the economy.
6 The main assumption is that asset markets are complete and 
perfect.  I  then  derive  the  Lewis  (1995)  and  Backus  et  al.  (2003)  general 
proposition about exchange-rate changes and my decomposition. 
 
 
A. The economy 
 
The economy that I consider consists of K 
￿
 2 countries. The text focuses on 
two arbitrarily selected countries, called the home country (subscript k = 1) 
and the foreign country (k = 2). Each country has a representative consumer, 
with  a  standard,  strictly  quasi-concave  utility  function  defined over N 
￿
 1 
goods,  and  with  lifetime  expected  utility  maximization  as  the  objective. 
Across countries these representative individuals may differ in terms of risk-
aversion, consumption preferences, time preferences, and initial wealths.  
  The outputs of each of the N goods can be stochastic over time. The 
economies could be exchange economies (with the endowment process given 
exogenously) or production economies with endogenous investment decisions. 
The specification of the production technologies or endowment processes is 
quite general: some goods may be produced everywhere, while other goods 
may  be  produced  only  in  some  countries.  International  shipment  of  these 
goods may be costly for some or even all of these goods; and the costs, if any, 
may involve fixed entry costs or fixed recurrent costs and/or purely variable 
costs,  possibly  with  economies  of  scale.  Given  these  costs  for transferring 
goods across countries, some goods may be traded all the time, some may be 
tradable  in  the  strict  sense  (that  is,  traded  only  if  the  price  difference  is 
sufficiently large to justify incurring the shipment costs), and some goods may 
be de facto non-tradable.   
  As  in  most  general-equilibrium  models  of  the  exchange  rate,  the 
assumption is that financial markets are frictionless and complete, and admit 
no arbitrage opportunities. This assumption allows us to derive the exchange 
rate without having to specify the opportunity set explicitly. Thus, in contrast 
to models such as Dumas (1992) and Sercu, Uppal and Van Hulle (1995) that 
solve a planner’s problem to characterize the equilibrium, We do not need to 
assume perfect competition in the commodity and factor markets. 
 
 
B. The exchange rate 
 
Let us first define the marginal indirect utility of nominal spending in country 
k at date t, Lk. Consider the static problem of a consumer who faces prices for 
the N goods, pk(t), and who wishes to allocate an arbitrary budget of Ck(t) 
over  the  consumption  of  these  goods,  ck(t),  in  order  to  maximize  utility, 
Uk(ck(t), Xk(t), t), where Xk(t) is a vector of (possibly country-specific) state 
variables that affect utility.
7 This problem can be written as: 
 
V(Ck(t), pk(t), Xk(t), t) º 
Max,
cki(t)
 { } Uk(ck(t), Xk(t), t) – Lk [N,




V(Ck(t), pk(t), X(t), t) refers to the period-t indirect utility function of total 
spending, given prices, 
ck(t) denotes the vector of consumption quantities ckj(t) of good j (=1, …, N) 
consumed by the representative individual in country k (=1, …, K) at time t, 
Uk(ck(t), Xk(t), t) denotes the utility function of the representative investor in 
country k, and implicitly includes the discounting for time, 
pk(t) denotes the vector of local-currency price of good j in country k, pkj(t) 
Ck(t) denotes the nominal consumption budget, expressed in terms of country 
k's currency,  
Xk(t)  denotes  the  vector  of  Mk  state  variables  that  affect  the  utility  of 
consumption in country k 
 
Thus, the marginal indirect utility of nominal spending in country k is the 
multiplier in the above optimization problem: 
 
    Lk(Ck(t), pk(t), Xk(t), t) =  Fout!.  
 
For notational convenience, Lk(Ck(t), pk(t), Xk(t), t) is often abbreviated into 
Lk(t), below. 
  Let's now assume that financial markets are complete and perfect,  
and admit no arbitrage opportunities. This allows us to derive the exchange 
rate without having to specify the opportunity set explicitly. In Lemma 1.1 
below, the marginal indirect utility of nominal spending in the two countries is 
linked  to  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  S(t),  defined  as  units  of  country-1 




In  an  international  economy with complete, arbitrage-free and frictionless 
capital    markets,  the  change in the nominal exchange rate, S(t+1)/S(t), is 
given  by  the  ratio  of  the  change  in  the  marginal  indirect  utility  of  total 
nominal spending in the two countries: 
 
Fout!=   Fout!       (1.1) 
 
The level of the nominal exchange rate, S(t), therefore, is proportional to the 
ratio  of  the  marginal  indirect  utilities  of  nominal  spending  in  the  two 
countries: 
 
S(t)  = q2  Fout!,        (1.2) 
 
where q2 is a constant. 
 
Proof 
Let dki(t+1) be the nominal payoffs from security i in currency k at time t+1, 
and let the time-t price of this security in terms of currency k be given by 
Pki(t). In an arbitrage-free and frictionless capital market, the (nominal) price 
of security i in terms of the currency of country 2 is 
 
    P2i(t)  = Et  Fout!, 
    = Et [ m2(t+1) d2i(t+1)] ,        (1.3) 
 
where mk(t+1) º Lk(t+1)/ Lk(t) denotes the pricing kernel in country 2. In 
currency  1,  a  similar  equation,  P1i(t)  =  Et  [m1(t+1)  d1i(t+1)],  holds.  In 
addition,  in  frictionless  and  arbitrage-free  markets  the  home-  and  foreign-
currency future payoffs are related as d1i(t+1) = S(t+1) d2i(t+1), while the 
home- and foreign-currency current prices are likewise related as P1i(t) = S(t) 
P2i(t).  Thus,  for  any  asset  i,  the  home-country  pricing  equation  can  be 
expressed as 
 
P2i(t) S(t)  =  Et [ ] m1(t+1) [S(t+1) ¥ d2i(t+1)]    .    (1.4) 
 
Equations  (1.3)  and  (1.4)  imply  the  following  set  of  restrictions  on  the 
exchange rate:   
  
Et Fout!=  0 ,  for all assets i.      (1.5) 
 
One solution that satisfies (1.5) is that, in each state at time t+1, the exchange 
rate change is given by 
 
     Fout!=  Fout!.       (1.6) 
 
In complete markets there can only be one set of exchange rate changes that 
satisfy (1.5), so it must be (1.6). Substituting the definition of mk(t) into (1.6) 
yields the expression for the change in the exchange rate in (1.1). Lastly, to 
get (1.2), note that, from (1.1), S(t) must be proportional to L2(t)/L1(t). The 
proportionality factor, denoted by q2, must be constant since it cancels out in 
(1.6). //// 
  An  economic  interpretation  of  q2  is  offered  in  Section  III.C.  To 
obtain an expression for changes in the exchange rate in terms of inflation and 
growth in nominal spending, consider a first-order Slutsky decomposition of 
the changes in the marginal indirect utilities, as in, for instance, Barten (1964) 
and  Breeden  (1978).  That  is,  decompose  dLk/Lk  into  the  effect  of  the 
curvature of the indirect utility (the degree of relative risk aversion) and the 
effects of changes in each of the arguments of the indirect utility—the nominal 
spendings, the prices for all goods, and time. To a first-order approximation,
9 
the change in the log nominal exchange rate is then given by the sum of at 
least three terms. The first term captures the international differences in time-
preference patterns—the changes in the marginal utility caused by the mere 
passing of time, holding constant consumption and prices. The second term is 
the  international  difference  in  real  consumption  growth  rates,  weighted  by 
each country's relative risk aversion, and the third term is the international 
difference  in  marginal  inflation  rates.  If  utility  is  state-dependent,  then 
exchange  rate  changes  reflect,  in  addition,  changes  in  all  relevant  state 
variables.  Note  that  dP/P  and  dp/p  is  just  notation  for  the  average  and 
marginal inflation rates; the integrated levels, P and p, do not generally exist.  
 
Proposition 1.1 
The change in the nominal exchange rate, to a first -order approximation, is 
 
      Fout!= [d2(t) – d1(t)] dt  + h1(t) Fout!– h2(t) Fout! 
   + Fout!–  Fout!+ Fout!z1sFout!–   Fout!z2sFout!,  (1.7) 
 
where 
  dk(t)  º – Fout!, the semi-elasticity of marginal utility with respect to 
time, that is, the measure of  instantaneous time preference, 
         hk(t) º   – Fout!, the degree of relative risk aversion,
10 
  zk,s(t)  º  Fout!,the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to state  
variable Xk,s,  
  Fout!  º Fout!, inflation weighted on the basis of total consumption,
11  
and 





Start from the total differential of Lk = Lk(Ck, pk, Xk, t) and then substitute 
the  definition  Lk  = 
￿ Vk/
￿ Ck.  In  the  third  line,  use  the  definition  of  time 
preference  and  invoke  the  property 
￿ Vk/
￿ pkj  =  –  ckj 
￿ Vk/
￿ Ck  (Roy's 
Identity). Next, use the rule for differentiating a product and the definition of 
zks. Finally, bring out the percentage changes in the budget and the prices, 
rearrange, and use the definitions of relative risk aversion h and of total and 
marginal inflation: 
Fout!  =  Fout! 
    =  Fout!dt +  Fout! 
    =  –dk(t) dt + Fout! 
    =  –dk(t) dt  + Fout!+ Fout!
￿ ks Fout! 
    =  –dk(t) dt  –  Fout! 
–  Fout!pkj Fout!+ Fout!
￿ ks Fout! 
    =  –dk(t) dt – hk(t) Fout!– Fout!+ Fout!zks Fout!.  (1.8) 
Substitution of (1.8) into (1.6) then immediately produces (1.7). //// 
  Observe that the change in the exchange rate in our general model, 
(1.7), contains marginal inflation rates, dpk/pk, which are not observable, as 
well as the changes in unidentified state variables, Xks. In addition, in this 
very general formulation the time preference parameters, dk(t), the relative 
risk  aversions,  hk(t),  and  the  sensitivities  of  marginal  utility  to  the  state 
variables, zks(t), are as yet unspecified functions of the variables in the model. 
In  the  next  section,  I  specialize  the  model  of  the  exchange  rate  and  its 
dynamics into versions that can easily be estimated from the data.  
 
 
III.  THE  EXCHANGE  RATE  EXPRESSED  IN  TERMS  OF 
OBSERVABLES  
 
In this section, I first impose restrictions on the primitives so as to obtain the 
exchange  rate  level  and  its  dynamics  in  a  form  that  can  be  estimated 
empirically. The general exchange rate model in Proposition 1.1 turns out to 
encompass several recent equilibrium models that assume utility functions of 
the  state-independent/homothetic/constant-relative-risk-aversion/constant 
time-preference class but restrict the number of goods and countries, and the 
type of imperfections in the commodity markets. In the next section, we link 
the  general  model  to  classical  PPP  model  and  tghe  Balassa-Samuelson 
theories of deviations from PPP. 
 
 
A. Homothetic preferences 
 
To obtain a testable equation, one first needs to eliminate, from (1.7), the 
marginal inflation rate, for which data are not available. This is achieved by 
restricting the preferences to homothetic functions: under this assumption, the 
relative consumption pattern that follows is independent of the level of the 
total budget. The result is as follows: 
 
Proposition 2.1 
With homothetic utility functions, the change in the nominal rates, to a first-
order approximation, is given by 
 
Fout!=  [d1(t) – d2(t)]  dt + h1(t) Fout!+ [1 – h1(t)] Fout!–  h2(t) Fout!– 
[1 – h2(t)] Fout! 
  + M,S,s=1  z1sFout!–   Fout!z2sFout!,       (2.1) 
 
and the change in the real exchange rate is 
 
  Fout!=  [d1(t) – d2(t)]  dt + h1(t) Fout!–  h2(t) Fout! 
  + M,
￿ ,s=1   z1sFout!–   Fout!z  2sFout!.   (2.2) 
 
Proof 
With homothetic utility, pkj(
￿ ckj/
￿ Ck) = pkj(ckj/Ck), implying that dpk/pk = 
dPk/Pk. Substituting this in (1.7) gives equation (2.1). Equation (2.2) then 
follows immediately by subtracting the inflation differential from both sides of 
(2.1) and regrouping, on the right-hand side, the items associated with risk 
aversion. ////  
  From  (2.2),  changes  in  the  real  exchange  rate  reflect  differences 
across countries in real-spending growth corrected for the effect of different 
impatience rates dk(t), as well as changes in the state variables. It is easily 
verified  that,  if  utility  is  state-independent,  then  –dk(t)  –  hk(t) 
d[Ck/Pk]/[Ck/Pk] is just the growth rate of country k's marginal utility of real 
spending, decomposed into a part explained by time preferences and a part  
that reflects changing real consumption. However, it is important to realize 
that  real  spending  is  endogenous,  and  therefore,  depends  on,  among  other 
things, risk aversion and time preference. 
 
 
B.  The  exchange  rate  change  under  state-independent,  homothetic,  and 
constant-coefficient utility 
 
The problems of unspecified state variables and time-varying time preferences 
are  eliminated  under  the  assumption  of  state-independent  (SI)  and  time-
additive lifetime utility with constant time preference (CTP): that is, lifetime 
utility 
￿ T,s=t  U(ck(s),  Xk(s),  s)  is  of  the  form 
￿ T,s=t  exp(dk s)  u(ck(s)). 
Under the additional assumption of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 




With  homothetic  constant-coefficient  utility  functions,  the  change  in  the 
nominal exchange rate, to a first -order approximation, is 
 
Fout!= [d1–d2] dt + h1 Fout!+ [1–h1] Fout!– h2 Fout!– [1–h2] Fout!. 
              (2.3) 
 
Proof 
Time-additivity  and  state-independence  imply  that  Lk(Ck,  pk,Xk,  t)  = 
exp(-dkt)  L*,k(Ck, pk)  
￿ where  L*,k(Ck, pk)  
￿ is  the  undiscounted  marginal 
utility.  Therefore,  our  earlier  measure  of  time  preference  simplifies  to  the 
constant dk: 
 
    dk(t)  º  Fout!=  dk. 
 
Making this substitution in (2.1) and assuming that hk(t) is a constant, we 
obtain equation (2.3). //// 
  Thus, with state-independence, constant time preference (CTP) and 
CRRA the intercept and slope coefficients in the real exchange rate model 
(2.2) are constants. This has obvious advantages for empirical tests on first-
differenced  logarithmic  data.  However,  the  empirical  literature  on  PPP 
increasingly relies on cointegration analysis using data in levels rather than in 
first-differenced form. To relate our model to tests of PPP based on the levels 
of exchange rates and of price indices, we need an integrated version of (2.3). 
This is provided in the next section. 
 
 
C.  The  level  of  the  exchange  rate  in  the  homothetic,  state-independent, 
constant-coefficient model  
 
To obtain the level of the exchange rate it is convenient to start directly from 
Lemma 1.1 rather than from (2.3).
13 I first derive the general implications of 
constant time preference and homotheticity for the level of the exchange rate, 
and I then impose constant relative risk aversion.  
  As mentioned before, with time-additive and state-independent utility 
functions and a constant discount rate, lifetime utility 
￿ T, t  U(ck(s), s, t) is of 
the form 
￿ T,s=t  exp(-dk s) u(ck(s)). When, in addition, utility is homothetic, 
the period-by-period utility function uk(ck(t)) can be written as F[uk(ck(t))], 
where uk(ck(t)) is linear homogenous in the consumption quantities and Fk is 
a  positive,  monotone  (and,  usually,  concave)  transformation.  The  function 
uk(ck(t))  can  be  thought  of  as  summarizing  the  consumption  preferences 
(which, for homothetic functions, are independent of wealth or total spending), 
while  the  curvature  of  the  transformation,  F(.),  reflects  the  degree  of  risk 
aversion.  This  separation  of  consumption  preferences  from  risk  aversion 
makes it possible to characterize the level of the exchange rate in terms of the 
level  of  nominal  spending,  the  price  level  and  relative  risk  aversion,  and 
possibly a time trend.  
  If  the  function  F[uk(ck(t))]  is  at  its  maximum  value  given  a 
consumption budget constraint, then uk(ck(t)) must also be at its maximum 
value  subject  to  the  same  constraint.  It  is  well  known  (see,  for  instance, 
Samuelson  and  Swamy  (1974))  that  the  solution  of the linear-homogenous 
problem,  
 
vk(Ck(t), pk(t)) º Max,
ckj(t)
   {uk(ck(t)) – lk(t) [
￿ ckj(t) pkj(t) – Ck(t)]} , 
                                                    (2.4) 
 
is  of  the  form  vk(t)  =  Ck(t)/Pk(pk(t)),  where  Pk(pk(t))  is  independent  of 
nominal  spending,  Ck(t),  and  is  linear  homogenous  in  the  prices.
14 
Accordingly, Pk(pk(t)) is interpreted as the price level in country k, and vk(t) 
=  Ck(t)/Pk(pk(t))  as  total  real  spending.  These  properties  of  homothetic 
functions lead to the following result: 
 
Lemma 2.1 
With homothetic utility functions and constant subjective discount rates, the 
level of the nominal exchange rate, S(t), is given by 
 
  S(t) =  q2
￿ exp[(d1–d2)t] Fout!.        (2.5) 
 
Proof 
Using  the  relations  Vk[Ck(t), pk(t),  t]  =  exp(-dk t)  Fk(vk(t))  and  vk(t)  = 
Ck(t)/Pk(t), we can specify the marginal indirect utility of nominal spending  
as follows: 
 
  Fout!  =  exp(-dk t)  Fout!        (2.6) 
 
    =  exp(-dk t)  Fout!.        (2.7) 
 
Substituting (2.7) into (1.2), we obtain (2.5). ////  
 
  Let us now interpret the constant q2 and the trend exp[(d1–d2)t] in 
equations (1.2) and (2.5). Observe that equation (2.5) implies that the real 
exchange  rate  is  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  for  an  international 
preference  ordering  of  the  form  exp(-d1t)F1(v1(t)) + 
￿ K,k=2  
qkexp(-dkt)Fk(vk(t)),  which  would  be  the  objective  function  if  one  were 
using  the  central-planner’s  approach  to  determine  exchange  rates  (see,  for 
instance, Dumas (1992) and Sercu et al. (1995)). Thus, qk corresponds to the 
weight assigned by the central planner to the utility of country k relative to 
that  of  country  1  and  determines  how  world  output  will  be  shared 
internationally, given the opportunity set. It follows that in a decentralized 
economy with complete markets, qk will depend on the factors that determine 
the  international  allocation  of  consumption—the  initial  wealths  of  the  two 
countries, which depend, in turn, on the initial endowments and the utility 
functions.  The  role  of  exp[(d1–d2)t],  then,  follows  immediately.  Different 
impatience factors mean that the two countries are depleting their wealths at 
different  rates.  Thus,  the  proper  interpretation  of  exp[(d1–d2)t]  is  that  it 
adjusts the initial q2 so as to capture this divergence of the two countries' 
wealths.  Stated  differently,  exp[(d1–d2)t]  reflects  one  of  the  causes  of 
divergence between undiscounted marginal utilities, dFk/dvk, and the model 
says that differences between undiscounted marginal utilities affect the real 
rate  only  if  they  are  not  the  reflection  of  heterogeneous  time  preferences. 
Thus, the model does not predict a time trend in the exchange rate (as (2.5) 
may seem to suggest). Rather, the role of the time trend is to correct the ratio 
of  undiscounted  marginal  utilities  for  divergences  that  merely  reflect 
differences in time preferences. 
  Given that the marginal utilities of aggregate real spending are not 
observable, equation (2.5) is still not in a form where it can be used to study 
the empirical behavior of the level of the nominal (and real) exchange rates; 
one needs to make the additional assumptions that investors have power utility 
functions, with constant relative risk aversion given by 
￿ k. This allows one to 
link,  in  a  tractable  way,  the  marginal  utilities of real consumption, to real 
consumption quantities for which data is available. Specifically, with power 
utility, the exchange rate becomes a loglinear function of both the price level 
and the level of nominal spending in the two countries, with the constraint that 
the  elasticities  of  each  country's  price  level  and  nominal  spending  sum  to 
unity.   
 
Proposition 2.3 
With homothetic preferences, constant subjective discount rates, and constant 
relative risk aversion, the nominal exchange rate  is 
 
  S(t) =  q2
￿ exp[(d1–d  2) t]
￿ Fout!
￿ ,      (2.8) 
 
where kk equals 1–hk when hk 
￿
1, and unity otherwise. The  corresponding 
real exchange rate is 
 




￿ .    (2.9) 
 
Proof 
The power or constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions have the 
form 
 




 1, substituting the power utility in (2.5) gives: 
 
   S(t) =  q2
￿ exp[(d1–d2) t]  Fout!. 
 
Equation  (2.8)  then  follows  upon  substituting  vk(t)  =  Ck(t)/Pk(t),  and 
simplifying the resulting expression. The proof for hk = 1 is analogous. //// 
 
  In  the  remainder  of  this  paper,  we  refer  to  the  model  with  state-
independent  and  homothetic  utility  with  constant  time  preferences  and 
constant relative risk aversions as the standard power-utility (SPU) model. 
 
 
D.  Relation to existing models of the exchange rate 
 
Proposition 2.3 encompasses many existing models of the exchange rate, that 
have typically been derived in settings with one or two goods (whereof at least 
one good is tradable only at a cost), equal impatience, and constant relative 
risk aversion. For example, the special version of equation (2.8) with h1 = h2 
and  d1  =  d2  has  been  obtained  by  Sercu,  Uppal,  and  Van  Hulle  (1995) 
assuming two countries, and one (imperfectly tradable) good, while Backus 
and Smith (1993) derive a similar model for the case of CES consumption 
preferences defined over one perfectly tradable good and one non-tradable 
good.  Stulz  (1987)  likewise  derives  (2.9)  from  a  two-country  production 
economy  with  log  investors  (h1  =  h2  =  1)  that  have  identical  dk's  and 
identical  Cobb-Douglas  preferences  defined  over  a perfectly tradable good 
and a non-traded good.
15  Thus, all these special versions generalize to cases  
where  there  are  N  goods  (regardless  of  their  degree  of  tradability)  and  K 
countries, and where the degree of relative risk aversion and time preference, 
as well as the commodity preferences, can differ across countries.  
  The model also nests the monetary economies considered in Bakshi 
and  Chen (1997) and Basak and Gallmeyer (1996), where the focus is on 
determining  the  prices  of  financial  securities  rather  than  expressing  the 
exchange rate in terms of observable variables and relating it to PPP. Bakshi 
and Chen characterize the exchange rate and prices of financial assets in terms 
of  exogenous  variables  in  an  exchange  economy  where  money  is  neutral. 
However, they restrict utility to log functions and the endowment processes to 
lognormal distributions; also, they consider only an equilibrium with perfect 
pooling, that is, without deviations from PPP. Basak and Gallmeyer (1996) 
characterize the exchange rate in an exchange economy with money in the 
utility function. In contrast to these models, there is no need to specify the role 
of money in the above model. 
   To conclude this section, note that the equilibrium approach is also 
compatible  with  the  Balassa  (1964)  and  Samuelson  (1964)  exchange  rate 
models, that link deviations from PPP to differences in productivity. These 
models assume that there is a non-tradable good (denoted, below, as good 0) 
in each country, and one perfectly tradable good (good 1). A price index— 
whether a real-world pragmatic measure such as a CPI or WPI, or a theoretical 
index  induced  by  a  particular  linear-homogenous  commodity  preference 
function uk(ck0, ck1)—is linear homogenous in the individual goods prices. 
Using this homogeneity property and commodity price parity for the traded 
good, the real exchange rate can then be written as a function of the relative 
prices of the non-traded good abroad and at home: 
 
  S(t) Fout!  =  S(t) Fout! 
      =  Fout!.        (2.10) 
 
Combining (2.10) with propositions about wealth-related differences 
in spending patterns and technology-related differences in productivities over 
time  and  across  countries  and  sectors,  Balassa  and  Samuelson  provide  an 
explanation  of  the  empirical  regularity  that  currencies  of  more  developed 
economies tend to be overvalued by PPP standards.
16 But (2.10), and therefore 
also  the  Balassa-Samuelson  propositions  based  on  (2.10),  is  perfectly 
compatible with the equilibrium approach. The intuition is that the general 
results  rely  on  asset-pricing,  without  making  any  assumptions  about  the 
production  side  of  the  economy.  For  this  reason,  these  results  must  be 
compatible with any specification of the economy’s production side provided 
the latter is compatible with complete and perfect asset markets. 
 
Corollary to Lemma 2.1 
The real exchange rate given in (2.10) is the same as the exchange rate in a 
complete-markets equilibrium model with a non-traded and a perfectly traded 
good. Thus, the Balassa-Samuelson explanations for deviations from PPP are 
compatible with the equilibrium approach to exchange rates.  
 
Proof 
 For  the  perfectly  traded  good  (good  1),  by  assumption  the  market  is 
frictionless and perfectly competitive, so the allocation of world output of that 
good must be Pareto optimal. Thus, this allocation must be the solution to a 
problem of the form 
 
Fout!exp[–d1t] F1[u(c10(t) c11(t))] + g2(t) exp[–d2t] F2[u(c20(t) c21(t))]   
        s.t. Fout!= –1,      (2.11) 
 
where g2(t) is a relative weight that reflects the international distribution of 
“income”  or,  more  precisely,  consumption  spending.  In  a  complete  capital 
market, the allocation of consumption of good 1 in each time-state, given the 
output  vector  and  the  shipping  costs,  must  be  entirely  determined  by  the 
agents' initial wealths; that is, the weight g2(t) in  (2.11) must be a constant 
that  reflects  the  initial  endowments.  Setting  g2(t)  =  q2,  the  first  order 
conditions of (2.11) are  
 
  exp[–d1t] Fout!= q2 exp[–d2t] Fout!.   
 
This can be re-arranged so as to isolate, on the right hand side, the real 
exchange rate as identified in Lemma 2.1:   
 
  q2 exp[(d1–d2) t] Fout!=  Fout!.  
 
From the individual budget allocation problem (2.4) we know that 
￿ uk(.)/
￿ ck1 
= lk(t) pk1(t); in addition, as already shown in footnote 14, a homogenous 
function  lk(t)  can  be  identified  as  vk(t)/Ck(t),  which,  in  turn  equals  the 
purchasing power, Pk(t)–1. Thus, the equilibrium condition is 
 
  q2
￿ exp[(d1–d2) t] Fout!=  Fout!,     (2.12) 
 
which is identical to the right hand side of (2.10). //// 
IV. PURCHASING POWER PARITY 
In this section, we first relate the general model of Proposition 1.1 to the PPP 
view of exchange rates and show that PPP holds only under very restrictive 
conditions. Relative PPP holds when 
 
  S(t) =  Y
￿ P1(t)/P2(t) 







￿ =  Fout!,
￿     (3.1) 
  
while  Absolute  PPP  holds  when,  in  addition,  the  constant  Y equals unity. 
Proposition  3.1,  below, identifies the alternative sets of assumptions under 
which equation (3.1) is true:  
 
Proposition 3.1 
Two alternative sufficient sets of assumptions for PPP are: 
 
(i)  commodity  markets  are  frictionless  and  agents  have  identical, 
homothetic consumption preferences—irrespective of their time and 
risk preferences. Then, also Y= 1 (Absolute PPP holds). 
(ii)  agents have linear homogenous utility functions (hk = 0) and equal 
impatience  across  countries  (d1 = d2)—irrespective  of  market 




To  prove  part  (i)  of  the  proposition,  note  that  under  the  assumptions  of 
frictionless  markets,  relative  prices  are  equal  all  over  the  world.  Given 
identical  and  homothetic  utility  functions,  it  follows  that  the  consumption 
bundles have the same (relative) composition across countries: at any time t 
there is but one composite good in the world, with time-varying composition 
proportional to the aggregate consumption amounts of the individual goods. 
The  quantities  of  this  aggregate  good  consumed  per  country  are  just  the 
vk(t)'s. Equation (2.5) implies that the real exchange rate is the marginal rate 
of substitution along an indifference curve F1(v1(t)) + q2 F2(v2(t)). As the 
composite good can be transferred internationally costlessly, this marginal rate 
of substitution of v1(t) for v2(t) always equals unity. This finishes the proof of 
Part (i). Part (ii) follows immediately from (2.5) by setting F(vk(t)) = vk(t) 
and d2 = d1. //// 
  From the above proposition, we see that PPP is a special case of the 
SPU model: PPP holds if the time-preference and h-related terms on the right 
hand side of (2.1) vanish. In case (ii) of Proposition 3.1, the terms hk and (d2 
– d1) are zero by direct assumption about the utility functions: investors are 
postulated to be risk neutral and have identical time preferences. Interestingly, 
this result for risk-neutral economies, already noted by Dumas (1992) in a 
single-good model with CRRA utility functions, does not in any way depend 
on arbitrage in the goods markets. For the more familiar commodity-arbitrage-
based case (i), in contrast, the terms in h and d cancel out across countries: 
under  the  assumptions  of  perfect  markets  and  identical  homothetic 
consumption  preferences,  there  exists  one  common  and  perfectly  tradable 
composite good; so the marginal utilities of real spending are equalized across 
countries.  Specifically,  in  (2.9),  d2t  dF2(t)/dv2(t)  always  equals  d1t 
dF1(t)/dv1(t), so that PPP obtains.  
  
 
VI.  EMPIRICAL  TESTS  OF  PPP  AND  THE  STANDARD  POWER 
UTILITY MODEL 
 
In this section, I briefly review the SU/ASU tests of the SPU (standard power 
utility) model in (2.8)-(2.9). The SPU model of the exchange rate, including 
PPP  as  a  special  case,  specifies  relations  between  levels  of  endogenous 
variables. As such, the model should be tested using techniques like GMM, 
instrumental variables, or cointegration analysis.
17 the SU/ASU approach is 
similar to what has become standard in the empirical literature on PPP: rather 
than requiring that equation (2.8) hold exactly at any given date, they verify 
whether  the  variables  identified  in  the  model  have  an  influence  on  the 
exchange rate in the long run. As they succeed in doing so, they also reject 
PPP—not necessarily in the sense that real exchange rates are non-stationary, 
but in the sense that PPP does not provide the best possible explanation of 
long-run exchange-rate behavior.  
  Thus,  in  the  tests  the  PPP  error-correction-model  is  extended  by 
introducing  the  additional  variables  suggested  by  the  SPU  model:  real 
spendings,  and  a  time  trend  to  allow  for  divergence  between  the  real 
consumptions  across  countries  caused  by  differences  in  international  time 
preferences. I first summarize SU's standard tests of the cointegration type. I 
then turn to ASU, who use regression analysis to compare the performance of 
the SPU model relative to PPP (which is nested in the general model) using 
the regression specification based on results in Phillips and Lorethan (1991). 
ASU  do  extensive  Monte-Carlo  simulations  on  the  distribution  of  the  t-
statistics under three alternative data-generating models that all exclude any 
role for real consumption but differ in their  assumptions about the relation 
between exchange rates and prices. They find that the SPU model outperforms 
PPP. 
  The  data  used  in  the  above  analyses  are  quarterly  consumption 
spending series, CPI data in the last month of the quarter, and end-of-quarter 
exchange rate data from IFS for the United States (US), Japan (JP), Germany 
(DE),  the  United  Kingdom  (UK),  and  Switzerland  (CH),  over  the  period 
1974:I to 1994:IV.
18   We take the USD as the reference currency (currency 
"1", in the theoretical part) and convert all exchange rates into USD per unit 
of foreign currency. In what follows, the other country is generally referred to 
as country k = {DE, JP, US, CH}.  
 
 
A. ADF and Johansen-Juselius Trace Tests of Sercu & Uppal (2000)) 
 
ADF  tests  for  unit  roots  and  Johansen-Juselius  tests  for  the  number  and 
properties  of  cointegration  relations  are  natural  preliminaries  for  the 
regression analysis, for a number of reasons. Unit roots are the motivation for 
ASU's adoption, in Section VI.B, of the Phillips-Lorethan (1991) specification 
of  the  regression  and  the  Monte-Carlo  based  confidence  intervals.  The 
Johansen-Juselius tests for the presence of cointegration confirm that the long- 
run relationship we are estimating in Section VI.B is really there. Lastly, the 
Johansen-Juselius  tests  of  the  hypothesis  that  the  long-run  coefficients 
conform to PPP provide additional support for our regression-based evidence 
against the PPP hypothesis.  
  First, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistics never reject the 
hypothesis that the data have unit roots cannot be rejected for any of the price, 
consumption,  and  nominal-rate  series.
19  The  next  step  is  to  estimate  the 
number  of  cointegration  relations  in  the  data,  using  the  Johansen-Juselius 
maximum-eigenvalue (lmax) and Trace statistics. These tests are carried out 
on both nominal and real data sets. The tests on nominal data in each of the 
bilateral data sets, the US versus country k, provide convincing evidence of at 
least one cointegration relation for all countries except Germany; for Japan, 
there  even  seem  to  be  at  least  two  such  relations.  Proceeding  under  the 
assumption that there is at least one long-run relation per country pair, and two 
for  the  JP-US  data,  SU  next  test  whether  it  is  possible  that  four  of  these 
relations are the PPP ones, with unit parameters for lnS, lnPus, and –lnPk. All 
tests,  corrected  for  small-sample  effects  following  Richards  (1995),  reject 
PPP.
20  This failure of PPP confirms the findings of others (see, for instance, 
Nessén (1994),
21 and Froot and Rogoff (1994)). The finding that the bs differ 
from  unity  already  suggests  that  prices  may  have  been  proxying,  to  some 
extent, for a missing variable.  
  The  tests  on  real  data  (that  is,  real  exchange  rates  and  real 
consumptions) provide additional evidence against PPP, as follows. First, tests 
on  the  five real-consumption data series, excluding exchange rates, do not 
reveal  any  long-run  relation  between  these  data.  This  implies  that  any 
cointegrating relation found in a set that includes real exchange rates must link 
the real rate to at least one of the real-consumption series, which then tells us 
that PPP is not the best possible long-run model for the real exchange rate. 
The findings from bilateral tests (data for each country k and the US) are as 
follows. For Germany, the Trace and lmax statistics for the hypothesis of no 
long-run relations are very close to the 10% critical value (the norm suggested 
by  Johansen  and  Juselius).  For  Switzerland  and  the  UK  the  bilateral  tests 
clearly reject the absence of any cointegration vector in the data. Only for 
Japan  do  the  bilateral  tests  provide  no  strong  evidence  of  a  long-run 
relationship among the real data. Thus, for two or three of the four country 
pairs there is good evidence that real exchange rates are linked to at least one 
of the real-consumption variables. In the next section, we verify whether the 
parameters of the long-term relationship are consistent, in sign and magnitude, 
with what one would expect under the standard power-utility model. 
 
 
B. Direct Estimation of the SPU Model (Apte, Sercu and Uppa ( 2006)) 
 
To test the SPU version of the equilibrium approach, one cannot use directly 
the  Johansen  and  Juselius  (1992)  and  Horvath  and  Watson  (1993)  tests 
because, unlike PPP, the SPU model does not specify exactly the long-run 
cointegration vector. That is, while PPP implies that, in a nominal model, all  
bs should equal unity, the SPU model says only that the coefficients in (3.4) 
are time-preference and risk-aversion parameters, and because our knowledge 
about these parameters is, at best, sketchy, there no longer are any specific 
hypotheses  about  the  long-run  coefficients.  Thus,  ASU  follow  a  more 
conventional regression approach: estimating the coefficients, checking for the 
right  sign,  and  testing  whether  they  differ  significantly  from  zero.  For  the 
estimation, they use a regression specification based on the work by Phillips 
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￿ t-l,t–l–1 Fout!+ 
￿
l=1,2 
￿ t-l,t–l–1 Fout!+ e 
 
where 
￿ t,t–lX(t) = X(t) – X(t–l). The first line in (4.1) is the model, stated in 
levels.  The  second  line  captures  the  first-order  autocorrelation,  r,  in  the 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium. The third line adds lagged changes 
in the relevant variables to pick up any remaining traces of predictability in 
the error. To estimate (4.1) ASU use Seemingly Unrelated Nonlinear Least 
Squares,  first  in  bilateral  estimations  (reported  in  Table  1)  where  no 
restrictions are imposed, and then in joint estimations where they restrict the 
value of bUS (the estimator of hus) to be the same across all the countries.  
  Rather  than  relying  on  asymptotic  normality,  they  evaluate  the 
significance of the t-statistics by means of Monte-Carlo experiments. In all of 
the experiments, price and consumption variables are generated on the basis of 
estimated VARs, because Johansen-Juselius tests do not reveal any relations 
among  the  five  price  series  nor  among  the  five  real-consumption  series 
separately. Specifically, the five inflation rates and real-consumption growth 
rates are first estimated, and then simulated, as mutually correlated ARIMA 
processes.  The  simulated  exchange-rate  data,  in  contrast,  are  produced  by 
three alternative "null" data-generating processes, none of allows a role for 
real consumption or a time trend. These three processes are: 
 
(i)  ARIMA: the real exchange rates are assumed to be non-stationary, 
and  follow  mutually  correlated  ARIMA  (2,1,0)  processes  (Roll 
(1977)).  
(ii)  PPP: the real exchange-rate equation has, in addition to the VAR 
part, an error-correction term that links the exchange rate to its PPP 
value. Again, the innovations are correlated across exchange rates. 
(iii)  Generalized PPP: the procedure is the same as in the previous model, 
except that now the coefficients dUS and dk in the error-correction 
term  for  the  nominal  exchange-rate  equation,  z  [S(t–1)  +  dUS 
PUS(t–1) – dk Pk(t–1)], are estimated rather than pre-set at unity. 
The motivation for this is that there may be omitted variables in the 





dUS.  However,  if  the  omitted  variables  are  the  real 
consumptions, then the estimates that do include real consumption 
would still reject the generalized-PPP model. 
   
For each data-generating process ASU simulate 3000 complete 90-
quarter, five-country samples (prices, consumptions, and exchange rates), and 
on  each  of  these  samples  ASU  run  (4.1),  either  bilaterally  or  with  the 
constraint that  bus (the estimator of hus) be identical across equations. They 
retrieve the t-statistics for each coefficient, rank them, and extract simulated 
percentile values. As the test on the coefficient estimating the time preference 
parameter is two-sided and as the estimates of h have occasionally the wrong 
sign,  ASU  provide  values  for  the  1st,  5th,  10th,  90th,  95th,  and  99th 
percentiles.  
  Relative to the standard critical t-values, ASU notice systematically 
thicker tails in the Monte-Carlo output. Across models, the "Generalized PPP" 
model  tends  to  generate  somewhat  wider  distributions,  while  across 
coefficients  the  thick  tails  are  especially  pronounced  for  the  time-trend 
coefficient.  For  all  countries  the  deviations  from  the  estimated  long-term 
relation are quite persistent, with r being around 0.8. This implies a half-life 
of four to five quarters, which is, encouragingly, much lower than the half-life 
of PPP-deviations estimated in Abuaf and Jorion (1991), three to four years. 
In the bilateral estimations, six out of eight h-estimates are positive; of the two 
negative  estimates,  only  one  (for  German  real  consumption  in  the  DEM 
equation) is significant. The average risk-aversion coefficient, 1.66. The time 
trend is clearly significant for the DEM and GBP, and weakly so for the CHF.  
  The above estimates in Table 1 ignore our prior that the US relative 
risk-aversion  coefficient  should  be  the  same  across  equations.  Monte-carlo 
simulations show that the data is easily compatible with a common coefficient 
for the US. When this common bUS is imposed across equations, the average 
estimate  of  relative  risk  aversion  across  the  five  estimates  is  virtually 
unaffected  (at  1.67).  While  the  estimated  coefficient  for  German  real 
consumption remains significantly negative, the UK estimate changes sign and 
becomes positive, and three out of the four time-trend coefficients are now 
significant. In short, in line with the conclusions from the previous section, we 
do find evidence that long-run PPP does not provide the best explanation for 
the  equilibrium  value  of  the  exchange  rate;  both  the  time-trend  and  risk-
aversion have noticeable effects, and in all cases but one the estimated risk-
aversion parameter has the correct sign.  
  Our conclusions differ from the ones obtained by Nissen (1997) and 
Koedijk et al. (1996): in all our tests, we consistently reject PPP, but find 
evidence that a time trend and spending data matter—while Nissen (1997) and 
Koedijk et al. (1996) do not PPP and find no evidence that spending has an 
effect.  Many  differences  in  the test designs may have contributed to these 
conflicting conclusions. First, the ASU regression specification differs from 
the  regression  tests  in  Nissen  and  Koedijk  et  al.,  but  this  turns  out  to  be 
unimportant. A second, and more crucial, difference is that ASU do allow for  
different  impatience  factors  and  risk  aversions.  Third,  the  ASU  sample  is 
restricted to countries that (with the exception of Japan, prior to 1982) did not 
have  pervasive  exchange  controls  for  most  of  the  period.  In  contrast,  the 
sample  in  Nissen  and  Koedijk  et  al.  contains  many  countries  that  had 
substantial exchange controls for most of the post-1973 period (Italy, France, 
and especially South Africa, Spain, and the Scandinavian countries). As the 
equilibrium model, including the special case obtained under SPU, assumes 
perfectly  integrated  capital  markets,  the  presence  of  restrictions  on  capital 
movements  is  likely  to  load  the  dice  against  the  model.  Interestingly,  in 
Koedijk et al. (1996), PPP does seem to do less well for the countries studied 





Much of the literature on exchange rate determination is based on PPP, with 
PPP  being  justified  on  the  basis  of  the  consumption  opportunity  set 
(frictionless commodity arbitrage). In contrast, the standard micro-economic 
equilibrium  paradigm  views  relative  prices—and,  hence,  also  exchange 
rates—as determined not just by consumption opportunity sets, but also by 
marginal utilities. Focusing on the marginal-utility aspect, the exchange rate 
can  be  characterized  in  a  general-equilibrium  economy  with  imperfect 
commodity markets but complete and frictionless capital markets.  
  On the theoretical front, in general, real exchange rates are related to 
differences in initial wealths and time preferences, and also to differences in 
marginal utilities of total nominal spending. The changes in the exchange rate 
can, therefore, be related to  
 
(i)  differences  in  growth  rates  in  real  consumption  weighted  by 
relative risk aversion,  
(ii)  differences  in  inflation  computed  on  the  basis  of  marginal 
spending weights,  
(iii)  differences in time preferences, and  
(iv)  other state variables that affect marginal utility. In the special 
case of homothetic and state-independent utility functions with 
constant relative risk aversion and time preference, one obtains a 
closed-form expression for the level of the exchange rate. This 
model  implies  that  there  are  missing  variables  in  the  PPP 
equation  (the  nominal  spendings  in  the  two  countries  and 
possibly also a time trend), and that the ceteris paribus effect of 
higher  domestic  prices  is  a  drop  in  the  value  of  foreign 
currencies  rather  than  a  rise  (as  predicted  by  PPP).  Unlike 
related general equilibrium models of the exchange rate, these 
results  are  derived  without  assuming  that  the  degree  of  risk 
aversion,  the  rate  of  time  preference,  or  preferences  over 
consumption goods are identical across countries.    
(v)   
  Sercu-Uppal  (2000)  and  Apte,  Sercu  and  Uppal  (2005)  use 
cointegration techniques to test the equilibrium exchange rate model assuming 
homothetic,  state-independent  power  utility  with  constant  time-preference 
parameters. When spending data are excluded from the model, as in standard 
cointegration tests of PPP, they reject PPP. Direct estimation of the model 
further  reveals  that  real  spending  and  international  differences  in  time 





1.  For example, Abuaf and Jorion (1990) use Dickey-Fuller tests to establish the presence of 
mean-reversion in real exchange rates, a phenomenon not evident from autocorrelations 
tests; and Johansen and Juselius (1992) refine the cointegration techniques in an attempt to 
find long-run relations between exchange rates and relative price levels that may be hard to 
detect in first-differenced data. Edison, Gagnon, and Melick (1997) show how the power 
of these tests can be improved using the Horvath and Watson (1995) procedure. Expanded 
data sets have been considered by, for instance, Frankel and Rose (1996), Froot, Kim and 
Rogoff (1995), Lothian and Taylor (1995), Wei and Parsley (1995), and Taylor (1996). 
Related work includes Engel, Hendrickson and Rogers (1996) and O’Connell (1996). A 
review of the empirical literature on PPP is provided by Froot and Rogoff (1995), Nessén 
(1994) and Rose (1996/7). 
2.  For a recent review of macroeconomic models of the real exchange rate, see Devereux 
(1997). 
3.  Empirical support for the effects of shipment costs has been documented in Engel (1993), 
Rogers  and  Jenkins  (1995),  and  Wei  and  Parsley  (1995),  who  find  that  a  significant 
proportion of the total variation in the real exchange rate arises from deviations from the 
Law  of  One  Price  (LOP).  Also,  Engel  and  Rogers  (1995)  show  that  within-country 
deviations from LOP are much smaller than cross-country deviations.  
4.  Other frictions could be introduced, like shipment lags (goods sent from one country at 
time  t  arrive  only  at  time  t+1)  and  transaction  lags  (a  trade  arranged  at  time  t  is 
implemented at time t+1 only). It can be shown that neither transaction lags nor shipment 
lags affect any of our conclusions. 
5.  The martingale pricing approach has been used to study the relation between exchange 
rates and international interest rates by Nielsen and Saá-Requejo (1993), Backus, Foresi 
and Telmer (1996), and Hollifield and Uppal (1997). See Duffie (1992) for details on this 
approach to asset pricing.  
6.  With money in the utility function, money balances should be interpreted as just an extra 
good, with price given by the interest rate, and total spending then defined as spending on 
goods plus the cost of holding money balances. On the other hand, in the presence of a 
transaction technology, the goods prices should include the cost of holding money, and so 
should the measure of total spending. 
7.  The optimal level of Ck(t), itself, would be obtained by solving the intertemporal problem 
of the consumer. 
8.  Lemma  1.1  is  a familiar result in the forward-bias literature—see, for instance, Lewis 
(1995). See Serrat (1996) for a similar application in a continuous-time framework. 
9.  A (second-order) Ito expansion shows that, in a model with continuous time and stochastic 
output processes, there will be a drift added to the right hand side of (7) that depends on 
the risk aversions and the (co)variances of the nominal spendings, the marginal inflation 
rates, and the total inflation rates. 
10.  This definition of relative risk aversion, also adopted by Breeden (1978), is a 'real' measure 
of relative risk aversion because, when taking partial derivatives with respect to Ck, we 




￿ Uk/dck].  
11.  When money is in the utility function, the interest rate will be part of the price index.  
12.  The marginal weights, [
￿ ckj/
￿ Ck] pkj, sum to unity by virtue of the budget constraint. For 
notational convenience, we denote the two inflation rates by dpk/pk and dPk/Pk, but we 
do  not  wish  to  imply  that  the  integrated  counterparts  pk  and Pk always have known 
closed-form solutions.  
13.  Under certainty, the standard calculus adopted thus far would be adequate; hence, equation 
(2.3) would immediately induce an expression for S(t) that is loglinear in the levels of the 
price indices and the consumption spendings. However, in a non-deterministic world one 
would need stochastic calculus, which would give rise to second-order terms. In both (1.7) 
and its special case (2.3) these second-order terms are missing. 
14.  Multiply both sides of the first order condition 
￿ uk(.)/
￿ ckj = lk(t) pkj(t) by ckj(t) and sum 
across the goods j: 
                       
￿ j 
￿ uk(.)/
￿ ckj ckj(t) = lk(t) 
￿ j pkj(t) ckj(t) 
The factor 
￿ j pkj(t) ckj(t) on the right hand side equals total consumption spending, Ck(t); 
and, because uk(.) is linear homogenous, the left hand side equals uk(t) or vk(t). Thus, 
lk(t) = vk(t)/Ck(t)  º Pk(t)–1. 
15.  The exchange rate equation in Stulz (1987) also contains interest rate terms because in his 
model money is an argument of the utility function.  
16.  Balassa and Samuelson argue that the relative prices in (2.10) are determined by relative 
production costs, and hence, by relative productivities in the sectors producing traded and 
non-traded goods. Non-tradables are associated with services and tradables with industrial 
goods; and in a more developed economy the weight for services is larger than it is in a 
less developed economy. Deviations from absolute PPP are then explained as follows. The 
productivity of labor in the industrial sector relative to that in the service sector is higher 
the more developed the economy. Thus, if country 2 is the more developed country, then in 
country 2 the relative price of non-tradables versus tradables is higher than in country 1. If 
there are equal weights across countries, this produces a real exchange rate in excess of 
unity; and this conclusion holds a fortiori if the weight for services is higher in the richer 
country.  Similarly,  it  is  argued  that,  over  time,  relative  prices  of  services tend to rise 
everywhere; however, as the weight for services is higher in the richer country, this effect 
leads to an appreciation of the real value of the currency of the more developed country, 
country 2. 
17.  In  practice,  tests  of  PPP  have  often  relied  on  standard  regression  analysis  of  first-
differenced data. The implications of our general model for such tests of PPP are discussed 
in Sercu et al. (1995), except for obvious generalizations associated with differences in 
risk  aversions,  time-varying  parameters,  and  deviations  between  average  and  marginal 
inflation rates. 
18.  Other economies had severe exchange controls for a substantial part of the sample period 
(France,  Italy,  Spain,  Scandinavia,  all  NICs  and  LDCs),  suffered  from  missing  data 
(Belgium). It is true that the UK, and especially also Japan, had exchange controls until the 
early 80s, but it was felt that these two major exchange rates could not be excluded from 
the tests. Dropping Japan from the tests does not affect the conclusions. We also used 
money supplies to proxy for aggregate consumption, which allows us to use monthly rather 
than quarterly observations. The drawbacks are that one then is assuming a cointegration 
relation between a country's spending and its money supply, which weakens the power of 
the test. The results with money are weaker than the ones reported here. 
19.  Note that, unlike in the Abuaf and Jorion (1990) tests, in Table 1 the hypothesis of a unit 
root cannot be rejected even for the real exchange rates. The likely cause of this difference 
is the loss of power from our use of a relatively short sample of quarterly data, rather than 
the long series of annual data used by Abuaf and Jorion but which then includes the time 
period where exchange rates were fixed rather than floating and there were restrictions on 
capital flows. 
20.  This holds whether we use data per country pair or all data at once, and, in the latter case, 
also whether we impose the restrictions one by one or all at a time 
21.  Relative to Nessén (1994), our cointegration analysis uses more recent results on critical 
values  when  testing  for  the  number  of  cointegration  relationships,  and  includes  a  
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